HEALTHCARE · HIPAA
HIPAA-Compliant AI: Clinical LLMs Where PHI Never Leaves Your Network
Your privacy officer will not sign off on pasting discharge summaries into a public chatbot — and they are right to refuse.
Written by Jakub Rusinowski · Last updated 2026-08-01 · Hardware figures computed by our VRAM engine
This page is practitioner guidance on deployment mechanics, not legal advice — involve your counsel or DPO for decisions about your specific obligations.
HIPAA-compliant AI means protected health information stays under the covered entity's control for the entire time a model processes it. The dependable way to get there is to serve an open-weight model from hardware you administer: with no third-party inference provider in the path there is no disclosure to a business associate, so no BAA is needed for the model itself, and the access-control, audit, integrity, and transmission-security standards of 45 CFR §164.312 are met by infrastructure your team already operates.
Why this is hard
- One pasted discharge summary is a disclosure to a third party — and you carry the burden of showing it was permitted.
- A vendor BAA binds the vendor. It rarely enumerates their subprocessors, and almost never the model host underneath them.
- Clinicians are already using AI on their phones. Shadow usage without a sanctioned alternative is the live breach risk, not a hypothetical one.
What the deployment gives you
PHI never leaves the covered entity
Inference runs on GPUs inside your existing network boundary, on hosts with no outbound route. "PHI cannot leave" stops being a policy statement and becomes a routing fact you can demonstrate to an auditor with a firewall rule.
Audit controls that actually satisfy §164.312(b)
Every prompt, retrieval, and completion is written to your SIEM with the user identity from your directory — not a shared service account. Reconstructing who asked what about which patient becomes a query, not an investigation.
De-identification as a pipeline stage
Safe Harbor's eighteen identifiers stripped in a deterministic pre-processing step, with expert determination where the use case needs richer data. A model prompt is not the place to ask politely for de-identification.
Minimum necessary, enforced by retrieval scope
The assistant can only retrieve from the records the requesting clinician already has a treatment relationship with. Scope is enforced in the retrieval layer, where it is verifiable, rather than trusted to the model.
What a HIPAA-safe deployment actually looks like
Four components, all inside the boundary you already defend. The only unusual element is the gateway, which exists so that authorization, redaction, and audit happen before a prompt ever reaches the model — the same reason you put an API gateway in front of a clinical system.
- Encryption at rest on both the model host and the vector index — addressable under §164.312(a)(2)(iv), and the only defensible answer after a stolen-drive incident.
- Unique user identification through your existing identity provider, so every audit record names a person rather than the application.
- A deliberate retention decision for prompt logs: they contain PHI, so they inherit your record-retention schedule and your disposal process.
- No outbound egress from the model host, enforced at the network layer — this is the control that turns the whole claim from policy into fact.
- Human review before anything reaches the chart. Model output is a draft for a clinician to accept, never an entry that writes itself.
What you have to satisfy
- 45 CFR §164.312 — Technical safeguards: Access control, audit controls, integrity, and transmission security — the four standards any system touching ePHI has to implement, AI included.
- 45 CFR §164.502(b) — Minimum necessary: Each use is limited to the PHI reasonably needed. In an AI system that is a retrieval-scoping decision, not a paragraph in a policy binder.
- 45 CFR §164.308(b) — Business associate contracts: Required whenever a third party creates, receives, maintains, or transmits PHI on your behalf. Self-hosted inference removes the party, and with it the contract.
- 42 CFR Part 2 — Substance use disorder records: Stricter and consent-based, above HIPAA. If these records are in scope, segregate the index — do not rely on prompt-level filtering to hold the line.
Models that fit this deployment
| 模型 | VRAM (Q4) | 可运行于 | 上下文 | 许可 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mistral Small 3.1 24B Clinic tier — one 16 GB card — Ambient documentation and summarization for a single site, on hardware that fits in a closet. ollama pull mistral-small3.1 | 15 GB | 24 GB GPU (RTX 3090/4090) Mac: 24 GB 统一内存 | 125K | Apache 2.0 |
| Qwen 3 32B Department tier — one 24 GB card — The workhorse for chart summarization and RAG over internal protocols and formulary documents. ollama pull qwen3:32b | 20.6 GB | 24 GB GPU (RTX 3090/4090) Mac: 32 GB 统一内存 | 125K | Apache 2.0 |
| Llama 3.3 70B Instruct Health-system tier — 48 GB class — Where clinical nuance matters most; still a single-card deployment on a pro GPU. ollama pull llama3.3:70b | 43.1 GB | 2×24 GB GPUs or 48 GB card Mac: 64 GB 统一内存 | 128K | Llama Community |
Deploying clinical AI without a disclosure?
We help healthcare organizations size, architect, and stand up on-premise AI that keeps PHI inside the covered entity — hardware sizing, model selection, audit and retrieval design, and the walkthrough your privacy officer will ask for. Vendor-neutral: we sell no hardware, no platform, and no model.
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