- Version
- Trust Services Criteria (2017, as revised)
- Publisher
- American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
- Last verified
- 2026-09-13
An attestation engagement in which an independent CPA firm reports on a service organisation's controls against the Trust Services Criteria: security (the common criteria), and optionally availability, processing integrity, confidentiality and privacy. A Type I report addresses design at a point in time; a Type II report addresses operating effectiveness over a period.
SOC 2 is an attestation performed by a licensed CPA firm. There is no "SOC 2 certification", and no tool can produce a SOC 2 report.
The Trust Services Criteria are AICPA material. We store criterion identifiers and our own descriptions only.
Our mapping points at the common criteria most often relevant to an AI deployment. Your auditor defines the actual scope, and a control we flag may sit outside it.
The three things buyers get wrong about SOC 2
Which criteria an AI deployment actually touches
Most of what an AI deployment needs from a SOC 2 perspective is in the common criteria and is not AI-specific:
- CC6 — logical and physical access. The inference endpoint authenticates callers; the retrieval corpus enforces the same access boundaries as the documents in it; the GPU host is not reachable from places it should not be.
- CC7 — system operations. Monitoring, detection, and incident response. The AI-specific widening applies here: your incident definition needs to include a system that worked as designed and produced a harmful output.
- CC5 — control activities, which is where a human oversight procedure sits if you have one.
- CC1 — control environment, which covers organisational structure and competence. The closest SOC 2 gets to the AI-literacy question.
If your organisation elected the confidentiality or privacy categories, those bring the more interesting AI questions: what personal data enters prompts and logs, what the retention rule is, and whether the disposal actually happens. Most organisations have not elected privacy, which is worth knowing before you rely on a report to answer a personal-data question.
What SOC 2 does not tell you about an AI system
This is the section to read if you are evaluating a vendor rather than preparing your own report.
A clean SOC 2 Type II report tells you that an auditor tested a set of controls over a period and found them operating. It does not tell you:
- whether the AI system is correctly classified under the EU AI Act,
- whether the model's outputs are accurate, fair, or monitored for drift,
- whether anyone can override a decision the system makes about a person,
- what data the model was trained on, or what the vendor's rights in it are,
- whether the model version changes under you and whether you are told.
None of those are SOC 2 failures — they are simply outside what the Trust Services Criteria address. The vendor evaluation checklist covers the questions that fill the gap, and the honest framing for procurement is: a SOC 2 report is table stakes for the security conversation and irrelevant to the AI governance conversation.
Deployment controls that relate to Trust Services Criteria
Criterion identifiers with our own descriptions — AICPA material is published under its own terms. Your auditor defines the actual scope, and a control flagged here may sit outside it.
Human oversight of AI outputCTL-OVERSIGHT-0011 mapping▾
A named human role that can understand the system's output and limitations, decide not to use it, and override or reverse it — with the authority and the time to actually do so. Oversight is a staffed procedure, not a checkbox in a UI.
CC5Conceptual· low confidenceControl activities, including those performed by people over automated processing
Conceptual. The Trust Services Criteria concern controls over the service commitments an organisation makes, not over harm to third parties. An oversight procedure may be in a SOC 2 scope, but SOC 2 does not require oversight of AI decisions about people.
Last verified 2026-09-13Personal data handling in the inference pathCTL-PRIVACY-0011 mapping▾
Establish the lawful basis, the data minimisation position and the retention rule for personal data that enters prompts, retrieval context or logs. Inference logging is the common failure: a system designed not to store personal data often stores it anyway, in the log.
P-series (Privacy criteria)Strong· medium confidencePrivacy criteria on collection, use, retention and disposal of personal information
The privacy category of the Trust Services Criteria addresses notice, collection, use, retention and disposal. Applies only where the organisation has elected the privacy category into its SOC 2 scope, which many do not.
Last verified 2026-09-13Inference and audit loggingCTL-LOGGING-0011 mapping▾
Record what the system was asked, what it answered, which model version answered, who was involved and when — to a retention period you chose deliberately. For high-risk systems the deployer must keep the automatically generated logs.
CC7.2Strong· high confidenceMonitoring system components for anomalies indicative of malicious or erroneous behaviour
The common criteria on monitoring depend on logging as their input. Strong rather than direct because CC7.2 is about detection, and this control is about the record itself.
Last verified 2026-09-13Access control and network isolation for the inference endpointCTL-SEC-0011 mapping▾
Authenticate and authorise every caller of the model endpoint, and place the endpoint where only intended callers can reach it. An internal model server on an open port is a data-exfiltration path with a chat interface.
CC6.1 / CC6.6Direct· high confidenceLogical access security, and protection against threats from outside the system boundary
The common criteria on logical and physical access map directly to endpoint authentication and network placement.
Last verified 2026-09-13AI incident detection and responseCTL-INCIDENT-0011 mapping▾
A route for someone to report that the system did something wrong, a person who owns the response, and a record of what happened. For high-risk systems, serious incidents carry a reporting duty with a deadline.
CC7.3 / CC7.4Strong· high confidenceEvaluating security events and responding to identified incidents
Same shape as the ISO mapping and the same caveat about what counts as an incident.
Last verified 2026-09-13Named accountability and AI literacyCTL-GOV-0011 mapping▾
Someone owns this system by name. The people operating it understand what it can and cannot do. Article 4 of the AI Act makes AI literacy a duty for providers and deployers, and it applied from February 2025 — earlier than most of the rest.
CC1.3 / CC1.4Strong· medium confidenceManagement establishing structures and reporting lines, and commitment to competence
The control environment criteria address organisational structure and competence, though for the service organisation as a whole rather than for one AI system.
Last verified 2026-09-13Assess a specific deployment
The generic answer is on this page. The specific one depends on what your system is for, who it affects and what it decides — which is what the assessment asks about.
Automated assessment based on the information you provide. Not legal advice, certification or an audit.
Frequently asked questions
Can we get SOC 2 certified?
No, because certification is not what SOC 2 is. You engage a licensed CPA firm to perform an attestation engagement and issue a report. People say "certified" colloquially, but the distinction matters when you are reading someone else's report: there is no pass mark, there is an opinion and a list of exceptions.
Does a vendor's SOC 2 cover their AI features?
Only if those features were inside the system boundary described in the report, during the period the report covers. Features added after the period, or excluded from the description, are not covered. Ask for the report rather than the badge, and read the system description and the exceptions.
Which Trust Services Criteria matter most for AI?
CC6 (access) and CC7 (operations and incident response) carry most of the weight, because most AI deployment security is ordinary service security. If the organisation elected confidentiality or privacy, those bring the personal-data questions — but most have not elected privacy, which is worth confirming before relying on a report for a data-protection answer.
Is SOC 2 useful for EU AI Act preparation?
Partially, and in one direction. The security and logging controls a SOC 2 programme produces are the same controls Articles 12 and 15 ask about, so the work is not wasted. But SOC 2 will not classify your system, will not address human oversight of decisions about people, and says nothing about data representativeness. It is a useful floor and not a route.